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FRONTIER DEFENSE
TED

J•

WARNER

THE ESTABLISHMENT of Spanish dominion in the vast expanse
of northern Mexico, including the present southwestern borderlands of the United States, was an epic phase of the history of the
viceroyalty of New Spain. The economic and inissionary aspects
of this northern movement, which lasted more than two hundred.
and fifty years, have been described in considerable detail by many
historians, colonial and modern. Scholars have given less attention
to the problems and methods of military defense which increased
in importance during the last century and a half of the colonial
regime.
Military defense on the northern frontiers of New Spain served
a triple purpose: protection of Hispanic settlements and mission.:.
ary establishments against the possibility of revolt by "pacified"
Indians; defense against marauding attacks by nomadic or seminomadic Indians who had not submitted to Spanish rule; and
defense of the borderlands against possible encroachment by
foreign powers. During the sixteenth and seventeenth. centuries
the first two aims were paramount. During the eighteenth century
mounting pressure by marauding tribes, especially the Apaches,
became the major problem while the advances of France, England,
and Russia in North America also gave cause for concern.
Between I 530 and the end of the sixteenth century Spanish expansion into the northern reaches of Mexico was spectacular. 1
Nuiio de Guzman occupied Jalisco and the southern part of

Copyright 1964 by Ted

J. Warner

6

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW XLI: 1 1966

Sinaloa during the I 53o's. By I 58o a much larger area, comprising the modern Mexican states of Queretaro, Guanajuato, San
Luis Potosi, Zacatecas, Durango, and part of Chihuahua, had been
occupied. Before the close of the century Spanish settlements
were founded as far north as Monterrey in Nuevo Leon and in
New Mexico. This rapid advance of the frontier had been
prompted by the discovery of rich silver mines, followed by missionary activity, and the establishment of extensive landed estates
devoted to agriculture and the raising of livestock.
From Queretaro westward and northwestward to Durango and
Santa Barbara, and northward to San Luis Potosi, Saltillo, and
Monterrey, the Spaniards were harassed by persistent attacks from
nomadic and semi-nomadic Indian groups, generally classified as
Chichimecas. Chichimec hostility, aggravated by the slaving activities of Spanish colonists and soldiers, was a serious threat to
the security of the mining and ranch frontiers and to the Camino
Real on which the silver-laden caravans traveled from northwestern Mexico to the viceregal capital. To keep the raiders in check
the authorities sent out roving patrols of ten to thirty soldiers,
provided escort troops for the wagon trains, enlisted the aid of
Indian auxiliaries, organized punitive expeditions into native
strongholds, and even used portable and stationary blockhouses.
The most important innovation, however, was the development of
a system of forts and defensive towns placed at strategic points in
the tierra de guerra of the silver frontier of New Spain. This line
of fortified places resembled those used by the Romans for the
protection of the empire, and the lines of castles (hence the name
Castile) established in Spain during the invasions by the Moors.
These forts were called presidios, from the Latin term presidium,
meaning a garrisoned town or fortress. The line was not static, but
was constantly adjusted to meet new situations as the frontier
advanced. 2
The first presidios and garrisoned towns were founded during
the administration of Viceroy Luis de Velasco I (I550-I564). The
most important of these was the presidio at San Miguel in Guanajuato, designed to protect the Zacatecas-Mexico City highway. AI-
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though Velasco's efforts did not provide an adequate solution to
the problem, his realization of the need for presidios on the
frontier led the way for later administrators.
During the four years following Velasco's term as Viceroy serious political problems plagued the government of New Spain.
Consequently little or nothing was accomplished and the situation
on the frontiers continued to deteriorate. In I 568 raids by the
hostile tribes were particularly devastating, and as a result mining
was nearly at a standstill. The damage at the new mining camps
near Durango and Santa Barbara, recently opened by Francisco de
Ibarra, was tremendous. 3
When the new Viceroy, Martin Enriquez de Almanza (I 568I 580 ), arrived, political conditions were again stabilized, and it
was once more possible to give attention to subduing the enemy
Indians. Enriquez inaugurated a systematic policy of establishing
presidios along the northern frontier. He founded no less than
sixteen, and perhaps as many as twenty-two, military outposts at
strategic points near the main lines of communication northwestward to Zacatecas, Sombrerete, and beyond, and northward to the
area of San Luis Potosi. Several new defensive towns were also
founded as bases for troops serving on convoy duty on· the highways. The most important of these towns were Jerez de la Frontera
founded in I57o, Charcas and Tepexala in I573, Le6n and
Aguascalientes in 1575, and Saltillo in I 578. From these presidios
and defensive settlements the Spaniards waged campaigns of
"fire and blood" against the marauding Indian tribes.
Nevertheless, in the I 58o's the Spaniards found that, because
of the nomadic habits of the Indians, neither the erection of defensive towns and presidios on the frontiers nor punitive campaigns
by presidia! troops were sufficient to insure peace along the
Chichimec frontier. Despite Spanish efforts, the Indian attacks
continued and imposed a serious barrier to further expansion
northward. Therefore, the presidio system as an organized policy
under viceregal direction was given up in part, and frontier warfare was left in the hands of individual captains to seek solutions
to their own immediate problems in their own particular regions.
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Now viceregal policy was to negotiate peace treaties, offering
bribes of food and clothing to the Indians in the hope of inducing
them to settle near the Spanish defensive towns. Once the natives
had accepted a peace settlement, they were to be Hispanicized by
another frontier institution, the mission.
To facilitate the work of the missionaries the semi-nomadic
Indians were assembled at a "reduction"-a village or mission
community-where they could be instructed in the Catholic
religion and taught European customs. They were expected to
emerge from this training within ten years as useful, Christian,
and loyal Spanish subjects. Thus the missions also served a secular
purpose and as agencies of the state were to aid the advancement
of the frontier. A significant commentary on the Crown's association of the missions with frontier defense is the fact that the expenses of both the missions and the presidios were entered under
the account of the War Fund (Ramo de Guerra) in the records
of the royal treasury. 4 By the end of the sixteenth century the
combined efforts of mission and presidio had brought relative
peace to important areas on the frontiers, with corresponding benefits to Spanish exploitation of the northern silver mining regions.
The seventeenth century witnessed new advances. In the
west, the Jesuits penetrated into northern Sinaloa and thence
into the central valleys of Sonora, from which Father Kino and his
associates moved into Pimerfa Alta toward the end of the century.
East of the Sierra Madre Occidental, economic motives and the
missionary labors of Franciscans andJesuits opened up new areas
of Spanish control. The northern limits of these were an irregular
and Huctuating line of outpost settlements extending from Casas
Grandes southeast into Coahuila and Nuevo Leon. At intervals
the northward movement was retarded by full-scale native uprisings, such as the Tepehuan Revolt of I6I6-I6I7, and the expanding frontier was harried by intermittent attacks by unpacified
Indians from beyond or outside the limits of settlement. The
viceregal and provincial authorities now found it necessary to establish new garrison outposts in the north, to replace many of
those founded farther south during the preceding century. 5
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The last twenty years of the seventeenth century saw the
security of the northern frontiers seriously endangered by Indian
uprisings, beginning with the Pueblo Revolt of 168o in New
MexiCo, followed by widespread unrest from Sonora eastward to
the Conchos Valley and La Junta, and culminating in the Tarahumara rebellion of 1697. As a result, the presidia! system on
the northern frontier was reorganized, and a permanent garrison
was established in the El Paso area in 1683. 6 The second New
Mexico garrison 1,VaS founded at Santa Fe in 1693 after the reoccupation: of the province by Vargas. 7
Also during the 168o's and 169o's, the threat of French encroachment on the Gulf coast introduced a new factor in the
problem of frontier defense, and prompted the temporary occupation of Texas by Spain (1689-1693). 8 The fear of foreign encroachment continued .to influence governmental policy throughout the eighteenth century. It led to the permanent Spanish
occupation of Texas in I7I3-1719, and was one motive for the
founding of the province of upper California in the 177o's. Expansion of French activity into the southwestern plains inspired
concern for the security of New Mexico. Nevertheless, the major
problems of frontier defense were those created by the wide-ranging raids of Apache tribes driven southward by the Comanche
and other Plains Indians. The Apache menace, more than any
other single factor, influenced presidio organization and defensive
policies in northern New Spain in the eighteenth century.

BY 1725 a line of frontier presidios extended in an irregular arc
across two thousand miles from Sonora to Eastern Texas. These
frontier outposts numbe~ed sixteen, with a total force of only 8o6
officers and men. Standing like a lonely sentinel on the very edge
of the Spanish empire in America, some six hundred leagues north
of Mexico City, was the garrison of Santa Fe.
The size of each garrison varied from twenty-five to one hundred-the average was about fifty-with the governors of New
Mexico, Sinaloa, Coahuila, and Texas serving as captains of those
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at their provincial capitals. The governors received no additional
salary for performing this duty. The other presidios were commanded by captains who exercised almost absolute authority over
their men and the areas in which their posts were located. The
usual salaries were six hundred pesos a year for captains, and
four hundred fifty pesos for subordinate officers and enlisted
men. In some posts, however, the salary was as low as three
hundred pesos. The total amount paid by the government m
salaries for these troops was 366,833 pesos annually. 9

In relation to the vast expanse of the northern borderlands,
there were never enough troops available to provide adequate defense for all the towns, missions, and friendly Indian pueblos.
With only sixteen presidios in 1725 to guard two thousand miles
of frontier, it is no wonder that there were frequent requests by
missionaries, settlers, merchants, presidia! troops, and Christian
Indians to the viceregal authorities for additional garrisons.
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Missionaries, especially in New Mexico, frequently petitioned
for more soldiers to protect the missions, to help punish intractable
Indians, and to provide escort service between the various missions.10 Settlers begged for presidios and soldiers to protect their
homes, families, ranches, and farms from the depredations of
marauding Indians. Very often, able-bodied settlers were drafted
for campaign service when there were not enough presidia! soldiers, a chronic cause for complaint. So the civilian population
repeatedly asked for additional troops in order to lessen the demands for their services on extended campaigns, during which
they were forced to leave their farms, ranches, and families untended and unprotected. Sometimes, when they returned from
military service, they found their homes destroyed and their wives
and children murdered. Merchants needed presidia} soldiers to
act as escorts for their caravans when they travelled through hostile territory, a situation which invited attack. On occasion presidia! captains exploited this danger to extort large sums of money in
exchange for the necessary military protection. 11 The soldiers stationed at frontier presidios also hoped for reinforcements and the
founding of additional garrisons to lessen their burdens and
responsibilities.
Even the non-Christian Indians learned to appreciate certain
advantages of having a presidio in their vicinity. It offered them
an opportunity to secure horses by raiding the presidia! herd, to
say nothing of procuring such military supplies as guns and ammunition, as well as knives and other hardware, by illegal trade
with individual soldiers. The traffic flourished in spite of strict
prohibitions and severe penalties. 12 That the soldiers would trade
their weapons and other equipment to the very people who might
use these against them in battle is a sad commentary on military
discipline; and the barter of arms for food and clothing reveals the
shortcomings of the methods of presidia! supply which compelled
the soldiers to resort to such exchanges. The common soldiers,
unmercifully squeezed by the governors and their officers, were
almost forced to resort to such illegal exchanges to feed and clothe
their families.
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Certain Indians also sought the aid of the presidio when attacked by other tribes. They had learned that the Spaniards would
protect them from their enemies if they asked for baptism. Their
ardor for conversion generally disappeared as soon as the danger
which had compelled them to seek protection was eliminated. 13
Indeed, it appears that virtually everyone on the frontier considered the eres:tion of presidios a panacea. In 1 726, one astute ob- ·
server stated that if "every proposal for the foundation of presidios
were acceded to, the treasury of Midas would not suffice." He
suggested that "for colonial purposes the faith was sufficiently
spread out," and that provincial authorities, instead of proposing
the erection of new presidios, should devote more attention to
converting and consolidating Indian settlements within the areas
already protected by such garrison outposts. 14
The problems of administering the frontier presidios were many
and varied. The lack of sufficient trained and experienced officers
was a constant weakness in the entire system. A few officers and
presidio commanders, such as Urdaide in Sinaloa, Urdinola in
Nueva Vizcaya, Cruzate who served in both New Mexico and
Sonora, and the two Anzas, father and son, in Pimerfa, did achieve
considerable distinction. But men of this calibre were rare.
The most difficult and persistent problems related to methods
of presidio supply. In the beginning, the normal rate of salary for
enlisted personnel was three hundred pesos annually. With this
modest stipend the soldiers had to keep themselves and their families, as well as the arms and three horses required by the regulations. They were at liberty, however, to purchase needed supplies
and equipment wherever they could find the most favorable prices.
This method of supply was advocated by promoters of a new district or town where a presidio was located because 9f the benefit
to local trade and economy. 15 In the first quarter of the seventeenth century new methods of supply were developed. Paymasters collected the salaries of presidio soldiers in Mexico City,
purchased goods there, and conducted supply caravans to frontier
garrisons, where they paid the troops half in cash and half in pro-
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visions. 16 Unscrupulous officials took the opportunity to defraud
the soldiers of their meager pay by charging excessive prices.
Although salaries paid to presidio soldiers in the eighteenth
century were substantially increased, the troops derived little,· if
any, benefit. In this later period it was customary for a provincial
governor to provision the soldiers of the presidio at the town where
he had his official residence. The governors and captains maintained merchant-suppliers (aviadores) in Mexico who held power
of attorney to collect the annual salaries of the soldiers and purchased goods and equipment needed for the people at the frontier
outposts, where the governors or garrison captains distributed
them to the troops. 17 The annual salary for each soldier was entered in the presidio accounts once a year. When a shipment arrived, the individual soldier presented himself before the governor
or captain and requested the items he needed to maintain himself
and his family. The charges were entered in the presidio account
book and deducted from the soldier's salary credit.
This method of presidio supply resulted in flagrant abuse and
fraud. The soldiers no longer received any cash stipends but were
paid only in goods, for which the governors or garrison captains,
in collusion with the aviadores in Mexico, were able to charge
excessive prices. Because of the inflated costs, the individual soldier very soon overspent his annual salary credit and incurred
debts which were entered in the presidio accounts as the first
charge against his salary for the succeeding year. Thus he became
hopelessly encumbered with financial obligations to his governor
or presidio captain, and found himself completely at their mercy.
Another evil was the practice of deducting from the soldiers'
annual salaries charges called quites, premios, and sometimes
gastos (expenses). These special expenses, incurred iri Mexico
City by the aviadores and their agents, included perquisites or·tips
(regalias) paid to treasury officials to facilitate the release of
funds, and fees incidental to legal transactions relating to the
presidia! supply service. In 1724 Viceroy Casafuerte cited the case
of a presidio of fifty soldiers for which quites amounted to 16.8
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per cent of the total annual salaries of the garrison. 18 Such charges,
added to the high prices for supplies distributed to the troops, further aggravated the unhappy position of the presidials.
In the early decades of the eighteenth century there were also
chronic shortages of essential equipment, especially guns and ammunition. Horses and clothing were also difficult to procure. Such
conditions lowered the morale of the troops and made it difficult to
maintain discipline. Inadequately equipped, fed, and housed, the
presidio soldier developed an attitude of insubordination, or, at
best, of sullen obedience. He was compelled, almost for self-preservation, to engage in illegal trade with Indians, giving them
hard-to-procure military equipment in exchange for food and
clothing. The reliability of such troops was highly questionable,
although the exigencies of frontier defense called for trustworthy
and loyal troops.
Throughout the eighteenth century the Crown and the governmental authorities of New Spain gave increasing attention to
finding ways to insure more effective use of the presidio garrisons
and to eliminate abuses in the administration of the military outposts on the northern frontier. With this in mind, inspections of
the presidio line were made from time to time by experienced officers of high rank. Their findings became the basis of new
reglamentos for the relocation of garrisons and for the improvement of presidio supply and discipline. The Rivera visitation of
I 724-I 728 is one example of this continuing preoccupation with
problems of frontier defense. Finally in I 776, a major innovation
was introduced with the creation of the Commandancy General
of the Interior Provinces, a new governmental and military agency
with a large measure of autonomy in relation to viceregal authority and jurisdiction. But this new agency failed to achieve its objectives. Many problems of frontier defense, especially those related to the marauding attacks of the Apache and other seminomadic tribes, remained unsolved at the end of the Spanish
regime.
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No FORMALLY ORGANIZED presidio garrison had been established within the territory of the Spanish province of New Mexico
before the Pueblo Revolt of I 68o. This is rather surprising in
view of the isolation of the area, with a long stretch of unpacified
country between it and the other frontier settlements of northern
Mexico. The relatively easy pacification of the Pueblo area by
Juan de O:fiate, except for the Acoma affair of I 598-1599, and the
success of the Franciscan missionary effort during the years 16 I oI 63o doubtless served to convince both viceregal and provincial
authorities that Spanish supremacy could be maintained without
the aid of the usual frontier garrison. Moreover, the cost would
have increased the drain on the royal treasury, for the Crown and
viceregal officials had found it necessary to guarantee payment of
the salary of provincial governors and to subsidize the mission
supply service in order to maintain the province.
The defense of New Mexico depended upon a small corps of
soldier-encomenderos, normally thirty-five, who received tribute
from their encomienda Indians in lieu of salary for military service. As encomenderos these colonists were under obligation to
maintain arms and horses, to perform escort duty at outlying missions, and to serve in campaigns against Apache and Navajo
raiders on the mission pueblos. The only military official, other
than the governor and captain-general of the province, who received a salary from the royal treasury was an armorer responsible
for the repair and maintenance of essential weapons. The treasury
also made a small periodic outlay for the purchase of lead and
gunpowder. 19
In times of urgency, when it became necessary to conduct punitive expeditions against Apaches and Navajos, the encomendero
corps was supplemented by the enlistment, on a temporary basis
and without pay, of other colonists and a force of Pueblo Indian
auxiliaries. During the 166o's and 167o's recurrent attacks by
Apaches and Navajos threatened the security of the Hispanic
settlements and the mission villages. By the mid-167o's this
menace had become so serious that the viceregal government, in
response to representations made by the New Mexico community,
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authorized the dispatch of fifty soldiers, most of them conscripted
convicts, with weapons, horses, and supplies, to bolster the defenses of the province. In I 68o the Crown instructed the viceroy
to take whatever action he might deem necessary to insure the
safety of New Mexico, but the decision was too late in coming. In
August I 68o the Pueblo Indians rose in revolt and forced the
colonists and missionary friars to withdraw to the El Paso area. 20
In I 68 I a temporary presidio was established in the El Paso
area, pending the outcome of the expedition of I68I-I682 for
the recovery of New Mexico. In I683 this garrison, located on the
right bank of the Rio Grande a few leagues below modem Ciudad
Juarez, Chihuahua, was reorganized and placed on a permanent
footing by Governor Cruzate. The El Paso presidio was designed
to serve a dual purpose: to defend a strategically important frontier area of New Spain, and to serve as a base of operations for
the eventual reconquest of New Mexico. Ten years later, in I693,
Don Diego de Vargas, the Reconqueror, founded a second New
Mexico presidio at Santa Fe, officially christened "El Real Presidio
de Nuestra Senora de los Remedios y la Exaltaci6n de la Santa
Cruz de Santa Fe." The El Paso presidio had fifty soldiers with a
captain in command, the Santa Fe garrison a hundred Spanish
troops including officers and non-commissioned officers. By virtue
of his military title of captain-general, the provincial governor of
New Mexico served as the supreme military commander of both
garrisons. 21
The salaries of the soldiers changed rather frequently during
the decades after the first enlistments in I 68 I. In that year the
recruits for the El Paso presidio received annual stipends of 35o
pesos. 22 Documents for the years I 687- I 69o show a reduction to
3I5 pesos. 23 In I693, when Vargas established the Santa Fe
presidio, the annual salary of enlisted personnel was set at 450
pesos, but sometime between · I 697 and I 704 it was reduced to
400 pesos. 24 In I707 the stipend was raised to 43I pesos and between I 7 I 5 and I 726 it again went up to 4 5o pesos. 25 In I 726
Visitador Pedro de Rivera ordered a reduction to 400 pesos an-
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nually. 26 These ups and downs could not have been conducive to
an effective esprit de corps.
The New Mexico presidios were important links in the chain
of frontier military outposts in northern New Spain, and played
their part in the planning of defense on the northern frontier as a
whole. In the military history of New Mexico, however, they
represented a notable departure from older norms and precedents.
Reliance upon a small corps of soldier-encomenderos had, to be
sure, proved unsatisfactory during the years immediately preceding the Pueblo Revolt. In any case, since the encomienda system
was not restored in New Mexico after the reconquest and was
brought to an end by general legislation of the decade I7IO-I72o,
another solution had to be found. The older soldier-encomendero
group, some of whom did not return to New Mexico, were replaced by garrisons paid for by the royal treasury, and more immediately subject to the provincial governors and garrison
commanders responsible for administering the presidio supply. As
a result, the soldiers were more dependent upon the local authorities than the soldier-encomendero of the seventeenth century had
been. Although discipline and efficiency could have improved
under the new system, much depended upon the ·experience,
qualities of leadership, and personal ambitions of the governors
and commanding officers who now exerted a preponderant influence in local affairs.
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